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Case Selection in
Three Supreme Courts:
A Comparative Perspective
By Anna Nagaeva, chief counsel to a panel of the Supreme Arbitrazh
(Commercial) Court of the Russian Federation, and
J. Randy Beck, associate professor of law

Editor’s Note: The following is an excerpted version of the final white
paper presented at the International Research and Exchanges Board
symposium in Moscow during December. Please note that several sections of the final paper have been omitted for space.
ustice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the U.S. Supreme
Court believes that courts in the United States and
other countries have much to learn from one another:
“The U.S. judicial system will be the poorer ... if we do not
both share our experience with, and learn from, legal systems with
values and a commitment to democracy similar to our own.”1
Justice Stephen Breyer frequently emphasizes the benefit of studying the decisions and practices of other legal systems.2 Even their colleague Antonin Scalia, who rejects the citation of foreign precedent
in the course of interpreting the U.S. Constitution, nevertheless
acknowledges that “you do not understand your own legal system
– its distinctiveness, and what drives it – until you examine some
other system.”3
Though they sometimes take different positions on
contested legal issues, these jurists agree that lawyers
and judges can gain valuable information by
comparing and contrasting the legal systems of
different countries.

In this paper, we bring a comparative perspective
to an important procedural issue faced in many judicial systems. We examine the exercise of the power of case selection
in three supreme courts that have each been given some degree
of control over whether to accept particular cases for review.
Our focus will be two American courts, the Supreme Court of the
United States (USSC) and the Supreme Court of Georgia (GASC),
as well as one Russian court, the Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial)
Court of the Russian Federation (SACRF).
When a Supreme Court exercises the power to grant review in particular cases, its decisions raise profound questions about the court’s
role in the larger legal system. Case selection forces judges to reflect
on a court’s mission, its reason for existence.

The U.S. Supreme Court
photographs on this page
and page four are from the
collection of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The photographers are
Franz Jantzen and Lois
Long, respectively.
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RUSSIAN FEDERATION
The Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court of the Russian Federation.

Standards and procedures for review of lower court decisions
Supreme Arbitrazh (Commercial) Court of the Russian
Federation (SACRF)
The Russian arbitrazh courts4 were established in 1991 as a
separate branch of state courts dedicated to resolving commercial
disputes. The SACRF occupies the highest level of the arbitrazh
court system.
Potentially every arbitrazh case submitted to the SACRF might be
reviewed by the Presidium.5 But the application must go through a
preliminary filtering stage before being accepted for consideration.
The application is distributed to the appropriate panel according
to specialization and a judge is assigned. This judge takes primary

responsibility for the case and will participate in proceedings before
the Presidium if review is granted.
Within a month, the assigned judge and two other judges examine
the application and related documents to determine whether the
case presents grounds for review under article 304 of the Arbitrazh
Procedural Code (APC). The three-judge panel will issue an opinion
giving reasons for the decision to grant or deny review. An opinion
granting review will be sent to the opposing party, together with
the application and accompanying documents and a deadline for a
response. The Presidium will review a case within three months after
the panel decision granting review.

U.S. Supreme Court (USSC)
The current process for reviewing petitions for certiorari in the
U.S. Supreme Court has been in place for many years. Much of the
work of reviewing cert petitions occurs in the “cert pool,” in which all
but one of the justices participate.6 Cert petitions are divided among
the law clerks for the eight participating justices. The assigned clerk
must review the petition, along with any response, conduct appropriate research and prepare a short memorandum.
This “cert memo” will typically summarize the issues presented
and make a recommendation regarding whether the petition for
certiorari should be granted. The cert memo will be circulated for
review by the eight justices in the cert pool, any of whom might ask
his or her own clerks to do additional research.
The only justice who does not participate in the cert pool is Justice
John Paul Stevens, who prefers to review all petitions for certiorari
in chambers. Stevens’ four clerks divide the cert petitions among
themselves and prepare brief memoranda concerning petitions they
wish to bring to Stevens’ attention. Review by Stevens and his clerks
constitutes the principal institutional check on the cert pool review
process.
Cert petitions that have been reviewed are scheduled for consideration at a conference of the justices. Most petitions will not be individually discussed by the court. To receive individual consideration, a
justice must place the case on the court’s “discuss list.”
4
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Cases in which the cert pool memorandum recommends a grant of
certiorari are typically placed on the discuss list, and any justice may
add cases to the list. Certiorari will be automatically denied in cases
not placed on the discuss list by the day before the conference. Grant
of certiorari, which results in full briefing and oral argument, requires
the votes of at least four of the nine justices.
Rule 10 of the USSC sets forth the standards for review of peti-

tions for certiorari. The rule provides that review by writ of certiorari
“is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion.” The court will
only grant a petition for certiorari “for compelling reasons,” such as a
conflict of authority on an important federal question. The rule indicates that the court will “rarely” grant certiorari “when the asserted
error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
properly stated rule of law.”

Georgia Supreme Court (GASC)
A centralized administrative staff assists the GASC in reviewing
petitions for certiorari. Incoming petitions are assigned randomly to
staff attorneys, who do not specialize with respect to subject matter.
The staff attorney will first review the cert petition to ensure that
formal requirements have been satisfied and will then prepare a
memorandum summarizing the facts, the questions of law presented
and other relevant information.
The memo will typically include a recommendation as to whether
the petition for certiorari should be granted. The memo will be distributed to all seven of the GASC’s justices.
In addition to the staff attorney, each cert petition will be assigned
to one of the justices by wheel, meaning a particular justice receives
every seventh petition. The assigned justice reviews the petition and
presents the case at a conference of the court, making a recommendation that may depart from that of the staff attorney. The members of
the court then discuss the case and take a vote.
If the court unanimously agrees with the recommendation of the
assigned justice, the petition is granted or denied without further
discussion. If any justice does not agree with the recommendation,
he or she can ask that the petition be deferred for a “second reading”
by another member of the court.
At that point, justices may circulate memoranda concerning the
pending cert petition, which will be discussed and voted upon for the
second time at a later conference. Grant of a petition for certiorari
requires a majority vote of the court.7
The Georgia Constitution limits review of Georgia Court of

Justices of the Supreme Court of Georgia are: (back, l. to r.) Harris Hines, George Carley
(LL.B.’62), Hugh Thompson, Harold Melton (J.D.’91), (front, l. to r.) Carol Hunstein
(presiding justice), Leah Ward Sears (chief justice) and Robert Benham (J.D.’70).

Appeals decisions to cases “of gravity or great public importance.”8
The GASC rules provide little elaboration: “A review on certiorari is
not a right. A petition for the writ will be granted only in cases of
great concern, gravity, or importance to the public.”9
The rule does clarify, however, that “certiorari generally will not be
granted to review the sufficiency of evidence.”10

A comparison of case selection practices
Common features
A high level of selectivity
While procedures for case selection differ markedly in the three
courts we studied, they all produced comparable outcomes in one
respect: only a small percentage of proffered cases were accepted for
review.
The USSC reports that it received 7,496 case filings during its
October 2004 term. It accepted 87 cases (disposing of 85 in signed
opinions), indicating an acceptance rate of approximately 1.16 percent.11
Statistics published by the SACRF indicate that 16,172 petitions
for review were considered in 2005 and review was granted in 379
cases, generating an acceptance rate of 2.34 percent.12
Statistics from the GASC indicate that the court granted 43 out
of 527 petitions for certiorari in 2005, for an acceptance rate of 8.16
percent.13
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The relatively low case acceptance rate in these three supreme
courts highlights the fact that case selection represents a sort of
rationing process. Each court possesses only limited appellate
resources that can be brought to bear on the review of lower courts’
decisions. Case selection therefore constitutes an exercise in seeking
to ensure wise use of judicial resources.

Maintaining uniformity as a selection criterion
In both the USSC and the SACRF, the most commonly invoked
reason for granting review is the necessity to restore uniformity
in light of conflicting lower court decisions. It would probably be
accurate to say that the goal of maintaining uniformity in the interpretation of applicable law constitutes the principal rationale for
structuring a court system so that cases are funneled to a single court
of last resort.
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Case importance as a
selection criterion
All three supreme
courts give prominent attention in
the case selection
process to the
importance
of
cases presented for
review. While a variety of meanings could
be attached to terms like
“importance” or “public interest,” a core concept
applicable in all three courts is
that a case fitting these criteria must
generally affect more people than just the parties in the
particular litigation. A Supreme Court better fulfills its
unique role in the legal system if it carefully chooses cases
based upon their systemic impact, rather than the interests of
individual parties.

Avoiding mere “error correction”
All three supreme courts recognize that limited appellate resources
are best expended resolving appeals that will potentially affect many
people in multiple cases, not just the parties before the court. As a
corollary to this proposition, the American courts have concluded
that they should generally avoid mere “error correction.”
Even if the party filing a petition for certiorari makes a plausible
showing that a lower court erred in a particular case, that will not justify intervention by the USSC or GASC unless correcting the error
could affect the resolution of similar cases involving other parties.
The avoidance of mere error correction emphasizes the character
of case selection as a rationing process. Of course, this principle
tends to contradict a common popular understanding of the role of
a Supreme Court.
Lay people often see a Supreme Court as the final guarantor of
justice, the backstop to ensure that all cases will be properly resolved
according to law. We believe, however, that error correction should
generally be viewed as the responsibility of the intermediate appellate
courts, not a Supreme Court.

Variations in case selection processes
While the three courts were comparable in terms of the low percentage of cases accepted and the criteria applied in the selection
process, they differed significantly with respect to the procedures
employed.

Degree of judicial involvement
The process of case selection in the SACRF ensures a significant
level of judicial involvement in every case. By contrast, under the
screening process currently employed by the USSC, many requests
for review will be resolved without any justice having read the petition for certiorari.
Comparison of the case selection procedures in these three courts
raises the question whether the USSC should move in the direction
of the other courts (and its own earlier practice) so that the justices
6
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would devote more personal attention to the review of cert petitions.
In considering this issue, we return to the theme of wisely rationing limited judicial resources. In the 1920s, when the justices individually reviewed cert petitions, the court received fewer than 400
petitions annually.14 That amounts to approximately 5 percent of the
7,500-8,000 petitions filed in recent years.
The large number of cert petitions per judge in the USSC necessarily requires substantial reliance on staff assistance. Moreover, the
justices must allocate time between reviewing petitions for certiorari
and writing opinions in argued cases. Since the former responsibility is arguably less important than the latter, the USSC has made a
defensible decision to manage the certiorari process in a manner that
leaves more judicial time for the opinion writing task.

Discretion in the case selection process
The rules of the USSC explicitly affirm that the decision whether
to grant a petition for certiorari constitutes a matter of judicial discretion. There is a clear distinction between an appeal as a matter of
right and discretionary review by writ of certiorari.
In the SACRF, by contrast, the decision to review a lower court
judgment has been viewed as a legal decision. If the statutory standards for review are met, it has been thought that the court has a duty
to take the case.
We believe discretion in case selection allows a Supreme Court to
steward its resources and more efficiently fulfill its role in the overall
legal system. When the USSC receives a petition for certiorari showing an apparent conflict of authority among the lower courts, the
court sometimes concludes that it would be wiser to deny certiorari
and await further developments.
In some cases, the court wants to learn the views of additional
lower court judges on a difficult question before reaching its own
conclusion. In other situations, the particular case may constitute a
poor vehicle for resolving a conflict of authority, either because the
facts are atypical or because there are arguable jurisdictional defects
that could prevent the court from reaching the merits.
Finally, denying certiorari can give lower courts time to resolve a
conflict on their own without Supreme Court intervention. Such
discretion could prove useful to the SACRF in efficiently supervising
the system of arbitrazh courts.

Explanation of decisions denying review
The SACRF issues written opinions when it declines to review
cases from the lower courts. Opinions denying review contain varying degrees of explanation, depending on the particular judges writing the order. By contrast, the USSC and GASC generally do not
explain decisions rejecting petitions for certiorari.
Any serious effort to provide individualized orders explaining denials of certiorari would require the USSC or GASC to make a much
greater expenditure of judicial resources than that necessitated by current screening processes. We do not think the potential advantages of
explained denials merit such a large imposition on the justices’ time.
First, in the USSC and GASC, petitions for certiorari concern
access to a possible second layer of appellate consideration, one
designed to be used only selectively.
Second, if a Supreme Court exists primarily to maintain uniformity in the interpretation of law, failure to take any particular case can
Fall 2006/Winter 2007

create only a temporary systemic problem, easily corrected in time.
Third, the advantages of additional information from published
orders denying certiorari would likely be marginal, since the justices
have often explained in written opinions why they granted certiorari
in particular cases.

Expectations of the parties

and perhaps the GASC as well, might profitably consider bringing
greater specialization to bear on the review of petitions for certiorari.
In the USSC, this could be done by increasing the role of permanent
staff in the review of cert petitions. Memos from permanent staff
with relevant expertise could sometimes supplement the work of
clerks in the cert pool.
The GASC already uses permanent staff to screen petitions for
certiorari. Introducing greater specialization might be a relatively
simple matter, requiring minimal changes to the review process. Each
staff attorney could take responsibility for reviewing cert petitions
dealing with particular areas of the law and could be expected to
develop greater expertise over time.

The USSC clearly places the burden on the party seeking review to
do the work of persuading the court to take the case. The less detailed
SACRF requirements make it easier to file an application for review,
but also leave more of the burden of determining whether there are
grounds for review on the judges and
their staff.
Of course, a party seeking review
obviously has an incentive to make a
persuasive case, but additional guidance on the court’s expectations could
help both the parties and the judges.
While the three courts
The SACRF makes the decision
whether to accept a case based upon
were comparable in terms
the application of the party seeking
review. The opposing party may not
even know an application has been
of the low percentage of
submitted until the case is handed
over to the Presidium by the threejudge screening panel.
cases accepted and the
The practice in the USSC, by contrast, has been to call for a response
from the opposing party before
criteria applied in the
deciding whether to grant certiorari.
Hearing from both parties would
make the procedure more adversarial
selection process, they
and help in the decision making process. We therefore recommend that
the SACRF adopt the practice of calldiffered significantly
ing for a response from the opposing
party before deciding whether to refer
with respect to the
a case to the Presidium for review on
the merits.

Specialization among
reviewers
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procedures employed.

In the SACRF, applications for
review are considered by judges with
expertise in particular areas of law. By
virtue of their training and experience,
the judges are well positioned to evaluate the effect of a particular lower court decision on the relevant body
of law, hence the value of referring the case to the Presidium.
One perennial criticism of the case selection process in the USSC
has been that petitions for certiorari are reviewed by clerks with minimal legal experience. Without broad experience, they may be prone
to underestimate the practical import of an issue raised in a petition
for certiorari or the extent to which it departs from other decisions
in the field.
Drawing on the experience of the SACRF, we think the USSC,
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